| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17655 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17655 |
| The Electoral Consequences of Large Fiscal Adjustments | |
| Alberto F. Alesina; Dorian Carloni; Giampaolo Lecce | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-12-08 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The conventional wisdom regarding the political consequences of large reductions of budget deficits is that they are very costly for the governments which implement them: they are punished by voters at the following elections. In the present paper, instead, we find no evidence that governments which quickly reduce budget deficits are systematically voted out of office in a sample of 19 OECD countries from 1975 to 2008. We also take into consideration issues of reverse causality, namely the possibility that only "strong and popular" governments can implement fiscal adjustments and thus they are not voted out of office "despite" having reduced the deficits. In the end we conclude that many governments can reduce deficits avoiding an electoral defeat. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Taxation ; National Fiscal Issues |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17655 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575329 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alberto F. Alesina,Dorian Carloni,Giampaolo Lecce. The Electoral Consequences of Large Fiscal Adjustments. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17655.pdf（306KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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