| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w17661
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 17661
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| Fiduciary Duties and Equity-Debtholder Conflicts |
| Bo Becker; Per Strömberg
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| 发表日期 | 2011-12-15
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| 出版年 | 2011
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | We use an important legal event as a natural experiment to examine the effect of management fiduciary duties on equity-debt conflicts. A 1991 Delaware bankruptcy ruling changed the nature of corporate directors' fiduciary duties in firms incorporated in that state. This change limited managers' incentives to take actions favoring equity over debt for firms in the vicinity of financial distress. We show that this ruling increased the likelihood of equity issues, increased investment, and reduced firm risk, consistent with a decrease in debt-equity conflicts of interest. The changes are isolated to firms relatively closer to default. The ruling was also followed by an increase in average leverage and a reduction in covenant use. Finally, we estimate the welfare implications of this change and find that firm values increased when the rules were introduced. We conclude that managerial fiduciary duties affect equity-bond holder conflicts in a way that is economically important, has impact on ex ante capital structure choices, and affects welfare. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
; Corporate Finance
; Public Economics
; Industrial Organization
; Firm Behavior
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17661
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575336
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Bo Becker,Per Strömberg. Fiduciary Duties and Equity-Debtholder Conflicts. 2011.
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文件名：
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w17661.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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