| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17679 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17679 |
| Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes | |
| Alberto Chong; Ana L. De La O; Dean Karlan; Leonard Wantchekon | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-12-22 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Does information about rampant political corruption increase electoral participation and the support for challenger parties? Democratic theory assumes that offering more information to voters will enhance electoral accountability. However, if there is consistent evidence suggesting that voters punish corrupt incumbents, it is unclear whether this translates into increased support for challengers and higher political participation. We provide experimental evidence that information about copious corruption not only decreases incumbent support in local elections in Mexico, but also decreases voter turnout, challengers' votes, and erodes voters' identification with the party of the corrupt incumbent. Our results suggest that while flows of information are necessary, they may be insufficient to improve political accountability, since voters may respond to information by withdrawing from the political process. We conclude with a discussion of the institutional contexts that could allow increased access to information to promote government accountability. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17679 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575354 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alberto Chong,Ana L. De La O,Dean Karlan,et al. Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17679.pdf（389KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
