| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17696 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17696 |
| A Theory of Income Smoothing When Insiders Know More Than Outsiders | |
| Viral V. Acharya; Bart M. Lambrecht | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-12-22 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a setting in which insiders have information about income that outside shareholders do not, but property rights ensure that outside shareholders can enforce a fair payout. To avoid intervention, insiders report income consistent with outsiders' expectations based on publicly available information rather than true income, resulting in an observed income and payout process that adjust partially and over time towards a target. Insiders under-invest in production and effort so as not to unduly raise outsiders' expectations about future income, a problem that is more severe the smaller is the inside ownership and results in an "outside equity Laffer curve". A disclosure environment with adequate quality of independent auditing mitigates the problem, implying that accounting quality can enhance investments, size of public stock markets and economic growth. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Behavioral Economics ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel ; Development and Growth ; Growth and Productivity |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17696 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575371 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Viral V. Acharya,Bart M. Lambrecht. A Theory of Income Smoothing When Insiders Know More Than Outsiders. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17696.pdf（499KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
