| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17714 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17714 |
| Human Capital Risk, Contract Enforcement, and the Macroeconomy | |
| Tom Krebs; Moritz Kuhn; Mark L. J. Wright | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-12-29 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a macroeconomic model with physical and human capital, human capital risk, and limited contract enforcement. We show analytically that young (high-return) households are the most exposed to human capital risk and are also the least insured. We document this risk-insurance pattern in data on life-insurance drawn from the Survey of Consumer Finance. A calibrated version of the model can quantitatively account for the life-cycle variation of insurance observed in the US data and implies welfare costs of under-insurance for young households that are equivalent to a 4 percent reduction in lifetime consumption. A policy reform that makes consumer bankruptcy more costly leads to a substantial increase in the volume of credit and insurance. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; General Equilibrium ; Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17714 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575389 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Tom Krebs,Moritz Kuhn,Mark L. J. Wright. Human Capital Risk, Contract Enforcement, and the Macroeconomy. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17714.pdf（325KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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