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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w17726
来源IDWorking Paper 17726
Labor Supply of Politicians
Raymond Fisman; Nikolaj A. Harmon; Emir Kamenica; Inger Munk
发表日期2012-01-05
出版年2012
语种英语
摘要We examine the labor supply of politicians using data on Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). We exploit the introduction of a law that equalized MEPs' salaries, which had previously differed by as much as a factor of ten. Doubling an MEP's salary increases the probability of running for reelection by 23 percentage points and increases the logarithm of the number of parties that field a candidate by 29 percent of a standard deviation. A salary increase has no discernible impact on absenteeism or shirking from legislative sessions; in contrast, non-pecuniary motives, proxied by home-country corruption, substantially impact the intensive margin of labor supply. Finally, an increase in salary lowers the quality of elected MEPs, measured by the selectivity of their undergraduate institutions.
主题Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w17726
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575401
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GB/T 7714
Raymond Fisman,Nikolaj A. Harmon,Emir Kamenica,et al. Labor Supply of Politicians. 2012.
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