| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17726 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17726 |
| Labor Supply of Politicians | |
| Raymond Fisman; Nikolaj A. Harmon; Emir Kamenica; Inger Munk | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-01-05 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine the labor supply of politicians using data on Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). We exploit the introduction of a law that equalized MEPs' salaries, which had previously differed by as much as a factor of ten. Doubling an MEP's salary increases the probability of running for reelection by 23 percentage points and increases the logarithm of the number of parties that field a candidate by 29 percent of a standard deviation. A salary increase has no discernible impact on absenteeism or shirking from legislative sessions; in contrast, non-pecuniary motives, proxied by home-country corruption, substantially impact the intensive margin of labor supply. Finally, an increase in salary lowers the quality of elected MEPs, measured by the selectivity of their undergraduate institutions. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17726 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575401 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Raymond Fisman,Nikolaj A. Harmon,Emir Kamenica,et al. Labor Supply of Politicians. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17726.pdf（462KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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