| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17736 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17736 |
| Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence From Banking | |
| Sumit Agarwal; David Lucca; Amit Seru; Francesco Trebbi | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-01-05 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | US state chartered commercial banks are supervised alternately by state and federal regulators. Each regulator supervises a given bank for a fixed time period according to a predetermined rotation schedule. We use unique data to examine differences between federal and state regulators for these banks. Federal regulators are significantly less lenient, downgrading supervisory ratings about twice as frequently as state supervisors. Under federal regulators, banks report higher nonperforming loans, more delinquent loans, higher regulatory capital ratios, and lower ROA. There is a higher frequency of bank failures and problem-bank rates in states with more lenient supervision relative to the federal benchmark. Some states are more lenient than others. Regulatory capture by industry constituents and supervisory staff characteristics can explain some of these differences. These findings suggest that inconsistent oversight can hamper the effectiveness of regulation by delaying corrective actions and by inducing costly variability in operations of regulated entities. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17736 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575410 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sumit Agarwal,David Lucca,Amit Seru,et al. Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence From Banking. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17736.pdf（347KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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