| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17771 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17771 |
| Collateral Crises | |
| Gary B. Gorton; Guillermo Ordonez | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-01-20 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Short-term collateralized debt, such as demand deposits and money market instruments - private money, is efficient if agents are willing to lend without producing costly information about the collateral backing the debt. When the economy relies on such informationally-insensitive debt, firms with low quality collateral can borrow, generating a credit boom and an increase in output and consumption. Financial fragility builds up over time as information about counterparties decays. A crisis occurs when a small shock then causes a large change in the information environment. Agents suddenly have incentives to produce information, asymmetric information becomes a threat and there is a decline in output and consumption. A social planner would produce more information than private agents, but would not always want to eliminate fragility. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Business Cycles ; Money and Interest Rates ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17771 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575444 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gary B. Gorton,Guillermo Ordonez. Collateral Crises. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17771.pdf（479KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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