| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17810 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17810 |
| When is it Optimal to Delegate: The Theory of Fast-track Authority | |
| Levent Celik; Bilgehan Karabay; John McLaren | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-02-02 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | With fast-track authority (FTA), the US Congress delegates trade-policy authority to the President by committing not to amend a trade agreement. We suggest an interpretation in which Congress uses FTA to forestall destructive competition between its members for protectionist rents. We show that FTA is never granted if an industry is operating in the majority of districts. Second, the more equally distributed are the industries across districts and the more similar are the industries' sizes, the more likely it is that FTA is granted. This is true since competition over rents is most punishing when bargaining power is symmetrically distributed, and in that case the ex ante expected welfare of each district is lower without FTA. Third, if existing levels of protection are very different across industries, even if FTA is granted, it may not lead to free trade because a majority of industries may prefer the status quo to free trade. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; International Economics ; Trade |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17810 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575485 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Levent Celik,Bilgehan Karabay,John McLaren. When is it Optimal to Delegate: The Theory of Fast-track Authority. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17810.pdf（370KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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