| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17822 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17822 |
| Does Macro-Pru Leak? Evidence from a UK Policy Experiment | |
| Shekhar Aiyar; Charles W. Calomiris; Tomasz Wieladek | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-02-09 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The regulation of bank capital as a means of smoothing the credit cycle is a central element of forthcoming macro-prudential regimes internationally. For such regulation to be effective in controlling the aggregate supply of credit it must be the case that: (i) changes in capital requirements affect loan supply by regulated banks, and (ii) unregulated substitute sources of credit are unable to offset changes in credit supply by affected banks. This paper examines micro evidence--lacking to date--on both questions, using a unique dataset. In the UK, regulators have imposed time-varying, bank-specific minimum capital requirements since Basel I. It is found that regulated banks (UK-owned banks and resident foreign subsidiaries) reduce lending in response to tighter capital requirements. But unregulated banks (resident foreign branches) increase lending in response to tighter capital requirements on a relevant reference group of regulated banks. This "leakage" is substantial, amounting to about one-third of the initial impulse from the regulatory change. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Business Cycles ; Monetary Policy ; International Economics ; International Finance ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17822 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575497 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Shekhar Aiyar,Charles W. Calomiris,Tomasz Wieladek. Does Macro-Pru Leak? Evidence from a UK Policy Experiment. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17822.pdf（673KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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