| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17831 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17831 |
| Resolving Debt Overhang: Political Constraints in the Aftermath of Financial Crises | |
| Atif R. Mian; Amir Sufi; Francesco Trebbi | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-02-09 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Debtors bear the brunt of a decline in asset prices associated with financial crises and policies aimed at partial debt relief may be warranted to boost growth in the midst of crises. Drawing on the US experience during the Great Recession of 2008-09 and historical evidence in a large panel of countries, we explore why the political system may fail to deliver such policies. We find that during the Great Recession creditors were able to use the political system more effectively to protect their interests through bailouts. More generally we show that politically countries become more polarized and fractionalized following financial crises. This results in legislative stalemate, making it less likely that crises lead to meaningful macroeconomic reforms. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Public Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17831 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575506 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Atif R. Mian,Amir Sufi,Francesco Trebbi. Resolving Debt Overhang: Political Constraints in the Aftermath of Financial Crises. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17831.pdf（169KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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