| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17876 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17876 |
| Dynamic Adverse Selection: A Theory of Illiquidity, Fire Sales, and Flight to Quality | |
| Veronica Guerrieri; Robert Shimer | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-03-01 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a dynamic equilibrium model of asset markets affected by adverse selection. There exists a unique equilibrium where better assets trade at higher prices but in less liquid markets. Sellers of high-quality assets can separate because they are more willing to accept a lower trading probability. As a result, the emergence of adverse selection generates a drop in liquidity. It may also lead to a decline in the price-dividend ratio--a fire sale--and a flight to quality. Subsidies to purchasing assets may be Pareto improving and can reverse the fire sale and flight to quality. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17876 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575551 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Veronica Guerrieri,Robert Shimer. Dynamic Adverse Selection: A Theory of Illiquidity, Fire Sales, and Flight to Quality. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17876.pdf（239KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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