| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17883 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17883 |
| Referrals: Peer Screening and Enforcement in a Consumer Credit Field Experiment | |
| Gharad T. Bryan; Dean Karlan; Jonathan Zinman | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-03-01 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Empirical evidence on peer intermediation lags behind many years of lending practice and a large body of theory in which lenders use peers to mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard. Using a simple referral incentive mechanism under individual liability, we develop and implement a two-stage field experiment that permits separate identification of peer screening and enforcement effects. We allow for borrower heterogeneity in both ex-ante repayment type and ex-post susceptibility to social pressure. Our key contribution is how we deal with the interaction between these two sources of asymmetric information. Our method allows us to cleanly identify selection on the likelihood of repayment, selection on the susceptibility to social pressure, and loan enforcement. We estimate peer effects on loan repayment in our setting, and find no evidence of screening (albeit with an imprecisely estimated zero) and large effects on enforcement. We then discuss the potential utility and portability of the methodological innovation, for both science and for practice. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Economics of Information ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17883 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575558 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gharad T. Bryan,Dean Karlan,Jonathan Zinman. Referrals: Peer Screening and Enforcement in a Consumer Credit Field Experiment. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17883.pdf（669KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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