| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17898 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17898 |
| Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns | |
| Andrew Atkeson; Christian Hellwig; Guillermo Ordonez | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-03-08 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a market with free entry and exit of firms who can produce high-quality output by making a costly but efficient initial unobservable investment. If no learning about this investment occurs, an extreme "lemons problem" develops, no firm invests, and the market shuts down. Learning introduces reputation incentives such that a fraction of entrants do invest. If the market operates with spot prices, simple regulation can enhance the role of reputation to induce investment, thus mitigating the "lemons problem" and improving welfare. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Economics of Information ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Regulatory Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17898 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575574 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrew Atkeson,Christian Hellwig,Guillermo Ordonez. Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17898.pdf（502KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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