| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17904 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17904 |
| Status, Marriage, and Managers' Attitudes To Risk | |
| Nikolai Roussanov; Pavel G. Savor | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-03-08 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Status concerns can drive risk-taking behavior by affecting the payoff to a marginal dollar of wealth. If status concerns arise endogenously due to competition in the marriage market, then unmarried individuals should take greater risks. We test this hypothesis by studying corporate CEOs. We find that single CEOs are associated with firms exhibiting higher stock return volatility, pursue more aggressive investment policies, and are not affected by increases in idiosyncratic risk. These effects are weaker for older CEOs. Our results also hold when we use variation in divorce laws across states to instrument for CEO marital status. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17904 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575580 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nikolai Roussanov,Pavel G. Savor. Status, Marriage, and Managers' Attitudes To Risk. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17904.pdf（254KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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