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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w17904
来源IDWorking Paper 17904
Status, Marriage, and Managers' Attitudes To Risk
Nikolai Roussanov; Pavel G. Savor
发表日期2012-03-08
出版年2012
语种英语
摘要Status concerns can drive risk-taking behavior by affecting the payoff to a marginal dollar of wealth. If status concerns arise endogenously due to competition in the marriage market, then unmarried individuals should take greater risks. We test this hypothesis by studying corporate CEOs. We find that single CEOs are associated with firms exhibiting higher stock return volatility, pursue more aggressive investment policies, and are not affected by increases in idiosyncratic risk. These effects are weaker for older CEOs. Our results also hold when we use variation in divorce laws across states to instrument for CEO marital status.
主题Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w17904
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575580
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GB/T 7714
Nikolai Roussanov,Pavel G. Savor. Status, Marriage, and Managers' Attitudes To Risk. 2012.
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