| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17938 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17938 |
| Remedies for Sick Insurance | |
| Daniel L. McFadden; Carlos E. Noton; Pau Olivella | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-03-29 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This expository paper describes the factors that contribute to failure of health insurance markets, and the regulatory mechanisms that have been and can be used to combat these failures. Standardized contracts and creditable coverage mandates are discussed, along with premium support, enrollment mandates, guaranteed issue, and risk adjustment, as remedies for selection-related market damage. An overall conclusion of the paper is that the design and management of creditable coverage mandates are likely to be key determinants of the performance of the health insurance exchanges that are a core provision of the PPACA of 2010. Enrollment mandates, premium subsidies, and risk adjustment can improve the stability and relative efficiency of the exchanges, but with carefully designed creditable coverage mandates are not necessarily critical for their operation. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17938 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575614 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daniel L. McFadden,Carlos E. Noton,Pau Olivella. Remedies for Sick Insurance. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17938.pdf（260KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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