| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17945 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17945 |
| Investment Busts, Reputation, and the Temptation to Blend in with the Crowd | |
| Steven Grenadier; Andrey Malenko; Ilya A. Strebulaev | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-03-29 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We provide a dynamic model of an industry in which agents strategically time liquidation decisions in an effort to protect their reputations. As in traditional models, agents delay liquidation attempting to signal their quality. However, when the industry faces a common shock that indiscriminately forces liquidation of a subset of projects, agents with bad enough projects choose to liquidate even if their projects are unaffected by the shock. Such "blending in with the crowd" creates an additional incentive to delay liquidation, further amplifying the shock. As a result, even minuscule common shocks can be evidenced by massive liquidations. As agents await common shocks, the industry accumulates "living dead" projects. Surprisingly, the potential for moderate negative common shocks often improves agents values. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17945 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575621 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Steven Grenadier,Andrey Malenko,Ilya A. Strebulaev. Investment Busts, Reputation, and the Temptation to Blend in with the Crowd. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17945.pdf（532KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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