G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w17962
来源IDWorking Paper 17962
Layoffs, Lemons and Temps
Christopher L. House; Jing Zhang
发表日期2012-03-29
出版年2012
语种英语
摘要We develop a dynamic equilibrium model of labor demand with adverse selection. Firms learn the quality of newly hired workers after a period of employment. Adverse selection makes it costly to hire new workers and to release productive workers. As a result, firms hoard labor and under-react to labor demand shocks. The adverse selection problem also creates a market for temporary workers. In equilibrium, firms hire a buffer stock of permanent workers and respond to changing business conditions by varying their temp workers. A hiring subsidy or tax can improve welfare by discouraging firms from hoarding too many productive workers.
主题Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w17962
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575638
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GB/T 7714
Christopher L. House,Jing Zhang. Layoffs, Lemons and Temps. 2012.
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