Gateway to Think Tanks
来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w17962 |
来源ID | Working Paper 17962 |
Layoffs, Lemons and Temps | |
Christopher L. House; Jing Zhang | |
发表日期 | 2012-03-29 |
出版年 | 2012 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We develop a dynamic equilibrium model of labor demand with adverse selection. Firms learn the quality of newly hired workers after a period of employment. Adverse selection makes it costly to hire new workers and to release productive workers. As a result, firms hoard labor and under-react to labor demand shocks. The adverse selection problem also creates a market for temporary workers. In equilibrium, firms hire a buffer stock of permanent workers and respond to changing business conditions by varying their temp workers. A hiring subsidy or tax can improve welfare by discouraging firms from hoarding too many productive workers. |
主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17962 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575638 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christopher L. House,Jing Zhang. Layoffs, Lemons and Temps. 2012. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w17962.pdf(533KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。