| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w17999 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 17999 |
| Patent Disclosure in Standard Setting | |
| Bernhard Ganglmair; Emanuele Tarantino | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-04-13 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In a model of industry standard setting with private information about firms' intellectual property, we analyze (a) firms' incentives to contribute to the development and improvement of a standard, and (b) firms' decision to disclose the existence of relevant intellectual property to other participants of the standard-setting process. If participants can disclose after the end of the process and fully exploit their bargaining leverage, then patent holders aspire to disclose always after the end of the process. However, if a patent holder cannot rely on the other participants to always contribute to the process, then it may be inclined to disclose before the end of the process. We also analyze under which conditions firms enter cross-licensing agreements that eliminate the strategic aspect of patent disclosure, and show that, in an institutional setting that implies a waiver of intellectual property rights if patents are not disclosed timely, firms aspire to disclose before the end of the process. Finally, we study the effect of product-market competition on patent disclosure. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w17999 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575675 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Bernhard Ganglmair,Emanuele Tarantino. Patent Disclosure in Standard Setting. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w17999.pdf（641KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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