| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w18001 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 18001 |
| Executives' \"Off-The-Job\" Behavior, Corporate Culture, and Financial Reporting Risk | |
| Robert Davidson; Aiyesha Dey; Abbie J. Smith | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-04-17 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine how executives' behavior outside the workplace, as measured by their ownership of luxury goods (low "frugality") and prior legal infractions, is related to financial reporting risk. We predict and find that CEOs and CFOs with a legal record are more likely to perpetrate fraud. In contrast, we do not find a relation between executives' frugality and the propensity to perpetrate fraud. However, as predicted, we find that unfrugal CEOs oversee a relatively loose control environment characterized by relatively high probabilities of other insiders perpetrating fraud and unintentional material reporting errors. Further, cultural changes associated with an increase in fraud risk are more likely during unfrugal (vs. frugal) CEOs' reign, including the appointment of an unfrugal CFO, an increase in executives' equity-based incentives to misreport, and a decline in measures of board monitoring intensity. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18001 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575677 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Robert Davidson,Aiyesha Dey,Abbie J. Smith. Executives' \"Off-The-Job\" Behavior, Corporate Culture, and Financial Reporting Risk. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w18001.pdf（491KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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