| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w18031 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 18031 |
| Prudential Policy for Peggers | |
| Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe; Martin Uribe | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-05-03 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper shows that in a small open economy model with downward nominal wage rigidity pegging the nominal exchange rate creates a negative pecuniary externality. This peg-induced externality is shown to cause unemployment, overborrowing, and depressed levels of consumption. The paper characterizes the optimal capital control policy in this model and shows that it is prudential in nature. For it restricts capital inflows in good times and subsidizes external borrowing in bad times. Under plausible calibrations of the model, this type of macro prudential policy is shown to lower the average unemployment rate by 10 percentage points, reduce average external debt by more than 50 percent, and increase welfare by over 7 percent of consumption per period. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Business Cycles ; Fiscal Policy ; International Economics ; International Macroeconomics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18031 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575707 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe,Martin Uribe. Prudential Policy for Peggers. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w18031.pdf（166KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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