全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Pricing Regulation and Imperfect Competition on the Massachusetts Health Insurance Exchange

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w18089
来源ID	Working Paper 18089
	Pricing Regulation and Imperfect Competition on the Massachusetts Health Insurance Exchange
	Keith M. Marzilli Ericson; Amanda Starc
发表日期	2012-05-17
出版年	2012
语种	英语
摘要	We analyze consumer demand and model the effect of pricing regulation under imperfect competition using data from the Massachusetts health insurance exchange. We identify consumer demand using coarse insurer pricing strategies. There is substantial heterogeneity in preferences by consumer type, with younger consumers twice as price sensitive as older consumers. As a result, older consumers face higher markups over costs. Modified community rating links prices for consumers that differ in both costs and preferences. Constrained prices are not simply the population-weighted average of unconstrained prices, because community rating changes the marginal consumer firms face. Tightening rating regulations transfers resources from low cost to high cost consumers, but also reduces firm profits and increases overall consumer surplus. We use our model to examine other insurance regulations. For instance, minimum loss ratios (designed to limit firm profits) will also alter the transfers between consumers. Moreover, risk adjustment will be insufficient to equalize prices across consumer types, as markups still differ. As a result, without a mandate, the market can unravel due to differences in preferences alone
主题	Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w18089
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575765
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Keith M. Marzilli Ericson,Amanda Starc. Pricing Regulation and Imperfect Competition on the Massachusetts Health Insurance Exchange. 2012.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w18089.pdf（294KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览