| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w18095 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 18095 |
| Private Returns to Public Office | |
| Raymond Fisman; Florian Schulz; Vikrant Vig | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-05-17 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the wealth accumulation of Indian parliamentarians using public disclosures required of all candidates since 2003. Annual asset growth of winners is on average 3 to 6 percentage points higher than runners-up. By performing a within-constituency comparison where both runner-up and winner run in consecutive elections, and by looking at the subsample of very close elections, we rule out a range of alternative explanations for differential earnings of politicians and a relevant control group. The ``winner's premium" comes from parliamentarians holding positions in the Council of Ministers, with asset returns 13 to 29 percentage points higher than non-winners. The benefit of winning is also concentrated among incumbents, because of low asset growth for incumbent non-winners. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18095 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575771 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Raymond Fisman,Florian Schulz,Vikrant Vig. Private Returns to Public Office. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w18095.pdf（668KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
