| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w18174 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 18174 |
| Money Doctors | |
| Nicola Gennaioli; Andrei Shleifer; Robert W. Vishny | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-06-21 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We present a new model of money management, in which investors delegate portfolio management to professionals based not only on performance, but also on trust. Trust in the manager reduces an investor's perception of the riskiness of a given investment, and allows managers to charge higher fees to investors who trust them more. Money managers compete for investor funds by setting their fees, but because of trust the fees do not fall to costs. In the model, 1) managers consistently underperform the market net of fees but investors still prefer to delegate money management to taking risk on their own, 2) fees involve sharing of expected returns between managers and investors, with higher fees in riskier products, 3) managers pander to investors when investors exhibit biases in their beliefs, and do not correct misperceptions, and 4) despite long run benefits from better performance, the profits from pandering to trusting investors discourage managers from pursuing contrarian strategies relative to the case with no trust. We show how trust-mediated money management renders arbitrage less effective, and may help destabilize financial markets. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18174 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575850 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nicola Gennaioli,Andrei Shleifer,Robert W. Vishny. Money Doctors. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w18174.pdf（723KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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