全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Unions in a Frictional Labor Market

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w18218
来源ID	Working Paper 18218
	Unions in a Frictional Labor Market
	Per Krusell; Leena Rudanko
发表日期	2012-07-13
出版年	2012
语种	英语
摘要	A labor market with search and matching frictions, where wage setting is controlled by a monopoly union that follows a norm of wage solidarity, is found vulnerable to substantial distortions associated with holdup. With full commitment to future wages, the union achieves efficient hiring in the long run, but hikes up wages in the short run to appropriate rents from firms. Without commitment, in a Markov-perfect equilibrium, hiring is too low both in the short and the long run. The quantitative impact is demonstrated in an extended model with partial union coverage and multi- period union contracting.
主题	Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Labor Economics ; Labor Relations ; Unemployment and Immigration
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w18218
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575894
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Per Krusell,Leena Rudanko. Unions in a Frictional Labor Market. 2012.