| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w18237 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 18237 |
| Enhancing the Efficacy of Teacher Incentives through Loss Aversion: A Field Experiment | |
| Roland G. Fryer, Jr; Steven D. Levitt; John List; Sally Sadoff | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-07-19 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Domestic attempts to use financial incentives for teachers to increase student achievement have been ineffective. In this paper, we demonstrate that exploiting the power of loss aversion--teachers are paid in advance and asked to give back the money if their students do not improve sufficiently--increases math test scores between 0.201 (0.076) and 0.398 (0.129) standard deviations. This is equivalent to increasing teacher quality by more than one standard deviation. A second treatment arm, identical to the loss aversion treatment but implemented in the standard fashion, yields smaller and statistically insignificant results. This suggests it is loss aversion, rather than other features of the design or population sampled, that leads to the stark differences between our findings and past research. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18237 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575913 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roland G. Fryer, Jr,Steven D. Levitt,John List,et al. Enhancing the Efficacy of Teacher Incentives through Loss Aversion: A Field Experiment. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w18237.pdf（435KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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