| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w18280
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 18280
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| Fiscal Unions |
| Ivan Werning; Emmanuel Farhi
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| 发表日期 | 2012-08-02
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| 出版年 | 2012
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | We study cross-country risk sharing as a second-best problem for members of a currency union using an open economy model with nominal rigidities and provide two key results. First, we show that if financial markets are incomplete, the value of gaining access to any given level of aggregate risk sharing is greater for countries that are members of a currency union. Second, we show that even if financial markets are complete, privately optimal risk sharing is constrained inefficient. A role emerges for government intervention in risk sharing both to guarantee its existence and to influence its operation. The constrained efficient risk sharing arrangement can be implemented by contingent transfers within a fiscal union. We find that the benefits of such a fiscal union are larger, the more asymmetric the shocks affecting the members of the currency union, the more persistent these shocks, and the less open the member economies. Finally we compare the performance of fiscal unions and of other macroeconomic stabilization instruments available in currency unions such as capital controls, government spending, fiscal deficits, and redistribution. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics
; Fiscal Policy
; International Economics
; Trade
; International Finance
; International Macroeconomics
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18280
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575953
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Ivan Werning,Emmanuel Farhi. Fiscal Unions. 2012.
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文件名：
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w18280.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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