Gateway to Think Tanks
来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w18291 |
来源ID | Working Paper 18291 |
Legislating Stock Prices | |
Lauren Cohen; Karl B. Diether; Christopher Malloy | |
发表日期 | 2012-08-10 |
出版年 | 2012 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | In this paper we demonstrate that legislation has a simple, yet previously undetected impact on firm stock prices. While it is understood that the government and firms have an important relationship, it remains difficult to determine which firms any given piece of legislation will affect, and how it will affect them. By observing the actions of legislators whose constituents are the affected firms, we can gather insights into the likely impact of government legislation on firms. Specifically, focusing attention on "interested" legislators' behavior captures important information seemingly ignored by the market. A long-short portfolio based on these legislators' views earns abnormal returns of over 90 basis points per month following the passage of legislation. Further, the more complex the legislation, the more difficulty the market has in assessing the impact of these bills. Consistent with the legislator incentive mechanism, the more concentrated the legislator's interest in the industry, the more informative are her votes for future returns. |
主题 | Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing ; Financial Markets |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18291 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575966 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lauren Cohen,Karl B. Diether,Christopher Malloy. Legislating Stock Prices. 2012. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w18291.pdf(494KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。