| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w18313 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 18313 |
| The Need for Enemies | |
| Leopoldo Fergusson; James A. Robinson; Ragnar Torvik; Juan F. Vargas | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-08-17 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a political economy model where some politicians have a comparative advantage in undertaking a task and this gives them an electoral advantage. This creates an incentive to underperform in the task in order to maintain their advantage. We interpret the model in the context of fighting against insurgents in a civil war and derive two main empirical implications which we test using Colombian data during the presidency of Álvaro Uribe. First, as long as rents from power are sufficiently important, large defeats for the insurgents should reduce the probability that politicians with comparative advantage, President Uribe, will fight the insurgents. Second, this effect should be larger in electorally salient municipalities. We find that after the three largest victories against the FARC rebel group, the government reduced its efforts to eliminate the group and did so differentially in politically salient municipalities. Our results therefore support the notion that such politicians need enemies to maintain their political advantage and act so as to keep the enemy alive. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18313 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/575987 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Leopoldo Fergusson,James A. Robinson,Ragnar Torvik,et al. The Need for Enemies. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w18313.pdf（352KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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