| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w18358 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 18358 |
| Valuation, Adverse Selection, and Market Collapses | |
| Michael J. Fishman; Jonathan A. Parker | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-09-06 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a market for funding real investment in which valuation creates information on which adverse selection can occur. Unlike in previous models, higher amounts of valuation are associated with lower market prices and so greater returns to valuation, and this strategic complementarity in the capacity to do valuation generates multiple equilibria. In this region, the equilibrium without valuation is always more efficient despite funding projects that valuation would reveal as unprofitable. Valuation equilibria look like credit crunches. A large investor can ensure the efficient equilibrium only if it can precommit to a price and, for some parameters, only if subsidized. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18358 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576035 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael J. Fishman,Jonathan A. Parker. Valuation, Adverse Selection, and Market Collapses. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w18358.pdf（331KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
