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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w18418
来源IDWorking Paper 18418
A Fundamental Enforcement Cost Advantage of the Negligence Rule over Regulation
Steven Shavell
发表日期2012-09-27
出版年2012
语种英语
摘要Regulation and the negligence rule are both designed to obtain compliance with desired standards of behavior, but they differ in a primary respect: compliance with regulation is ordinarily assessed independently of the occurrence of harm, whereas compliance with the negligence rule is evaluated only if harm occurs. It is shown in a stylized model that because the use of the negligence rule is triggered by harm, the rule enjoys an intrinsic enforcement cost advantage over regulation. Moreover, this advantage suggests that the examination of behavior under the negligence rule should tend to be more detailed than under regulation (as it is).
主题Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w18418
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576094
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GB/T 7714
Steven Shavell. A Fundamental Enforcement Cost Advantage of the Negligence Rule over Regulation. 2012.
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