| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w18418 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 18418 |
| A Fundamental Enforcement Cost Advantage of the Negligence Rule over Regulation | |
| Steven Shavell | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-09-27 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Regulation and the negligence rule are both designed to obtain compliance with desired standards of behavior, but they differ in a primary respect: compliance with regulation is ordinarily assessed independently of the occurrence of harm, whereas compliance with the negligence rule is evaluated only if harm occurs. It is shown in a stylized model that because the use of the negligence rule is triggered by harm, the rule enjoys an intrinsic enforcement cost advantage over regulation. Moreover, this advantage suggests that the examination of behavior under the negligence rule should tend to be more detailed than under regulation (as it is). |
| 主题 | Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18418 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576094 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Steven Shavell. A Fundamental Enforcement Cost Advantage of the Negligence Rule over Regulation. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w18418.pdf（194KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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