| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w18453 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 18453 |
| Carrots that Look Like Sticks: Toward an Understanding of Multitasking Incentive Schemes | |
| Omar Al-Ubaydli; Steffen Andersen; Uri Gneezy; John A. List | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-10-11 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Constructing compensation schemes for effort in multi-dimensional tasks is complex, particularly when some dimensions are not easily observable. When incentive schemes contractually reward workers for easily observed measures, such as quantity produced, the standard model predicts that unrewarded dimensions, such as quality, will be neglected. Yet, there remains mixed empirical evidence in favor of this standard principal-agent model prediction. This paper reconciles the literature by using both theory and empirical evidence. The theory outlines conditions under which principals can use a piece rate scheme to induce higher quantity and quality levels than analogous fixed wage schemes. Making use of a series of complementary laboratory and field experiments we show that this effect occurs because the agent is uncertain about the principal's monitoring ability and the principal's choice of a piece rate signals to the agent that she is efficient at monitoring. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18453 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576128 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Omar Al-Ubaydli,Steffen Andersen,Uri Gneezy,et al. Carrots that Look Like Sticks: Toward an Understanding of Multitasking Incentive Schemes. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w18453.pdf（402KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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