| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w18468 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 18468 |
| Behavioral Hazard in Health Insurance | |
| Katherine Baicker; Sendhil Mullainathan; Joshua Schwartzstein | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-10-18 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper develops a model of health insurance that incorporates behavioral biases. In the traditional model, people who are insured overuse low value medical care because of moral hazard. There is ample evidence, though, of a different inefficiency: people underuse high value medical care because they make mistakes. Such "behavioral hazard" changes the fundamental tradeoff between insurance and incentives. With only moral hazard, raising copays increases the efficiency of demand by ameliorating overuse. With the addition of behavioral hazard, raising copays may reduce efficiency by exaggerating underuse. This means that estimating the demand response is no longer enough for setting optimal copays; the health response needs to be considered as well. This provides a theoretical foundation for value-based insurance design: for some high value treatments, for example, copays should be zero (or even negative). Empirically, this reinterpretation of demand proves important, since high value care is often as elastic as low value care. For example, calibration using data from a field experiment suggests that omitting behavioral hazard leads to welfare estimates that can be both wrong in sign and off by an order of magnitude. Optimally designed insurance can thus increase health care efficiency as well as provide financial protection, suggesting the potential for market failure when private insurers are not fully incentivized to counteract behavioral biases. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Economics of Information ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18468 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576142 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Katherine Baicker,Sendhil Mullainathan,Joshua Schwartzstein. Behavioral Hazard in Health Insurance. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w18468.pdf（517KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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