全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): A Game Theoretic Foundation of Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w18471
来源ID	Working Paper 18471
	A Game Theoretic Foundation of Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection
	Nick Netzer; Florian Scheuer
发表日期	2012-10-18
出版年	2012
语种	英语
摘要	We construct a fully specified extensive form game that captures competitive markets with adverse selection. In particular, it allows firms to offer any finite set of contracts, so that cross-subsidization is not ruled out. Moreover, firms can withdraw from the market after initial contract offers have been observed. We show that a subgame perfect equilibrium always exists and that, in fact, when withdrawal is costless, the set of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes may correspond to the entire set of feasible contracts. We then focus on robust equilibria that exist both when withdrawal costs are zero and when they are arbitrarily small but strictly positive. We show that the Miyazaki-Wilson contracts are the unique robust equilibrium outcome of our game. This outcome is always constrained efficient and involves cross-subsidization from low to high risk agents that is increasing in the share of low risks in the population under weak conditions on risk preferences.
主题	Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Public Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w18471
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576145
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Nick Netzer,Florian Scheuer. A Game Theoretic Foundation of Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection. 2012.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w18471.pdf（275KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览