| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w18511 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 18511 |
| Do Women Avoid Salary Negotiations? Evidence from a Large Scale Natural Field Experiment | |
| Andreas Leibbrandt; John A. List | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-11-01 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | One explanation advanced for the persistent gender pay differences in labor markets is that women avoid salary negotiations. By using a natural field experiment that randomizes nearly 2,500 job-seekers into jobs that vary important details of the labor contract, we are able to observe both the nature of sorting and the extent of salary negotiations. We observe interesting data patterns. For example, we find that when there is no explicit statement that wages are negotiable, men are more likely to negotiate than women. However, when we explicitly mention the possibility that wages are negotiable, this difference disappears, and even tends to reverse. In terms of sorting, we find that men in contrast to women prefer job environments where the 'rules of wage determination' are ambiguous. This leads to the gender gap being much more pronounced in jobs that leave negotiation of wage ambiguous. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Labor Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18511 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576185 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andreas Leibbrandt,John A. List. Do Women Avoid Salary Negotiations? Evidence from a Large Scale Natural Field Experiment. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w18511.pdf（184KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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