全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Information Acquisition in Rumor Based Bank Runs

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w18513
来源ID	Working Paper 18513
	Information Acquisition in Rumor Based Bank Runs
	Zhiguo He; Asaf Manela
发表日期	2012-11-01
出版年	2012
语种	英语
摘要	We study information acquisition and dynamic withdrawal decisions when a spreading rumor exposes a solvent bank to a run. Uncertainty about the bank's liquidity and potential failure motivates depositors who hear the rumor to acquire additional noisy signals. Depositors with less informative signals may wait before gradually running on the bank, leading to an endogenous aggregate withdrawal speed and bank survival time. Private information acquisition about liquidity can subject solvent-but-illiquid banks to runs, and shorten the survival time of failing banks. Public provision of solvency information can mitigate runs by indirectly crowding-out individual depositors' effort to acquire liquidity information.
主题	Macroeconomics ; Fiscal Policy ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w18513
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576187
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Zhiguo He,Asaf Manela. Information Acquisition in Rumor Based Bank Runs. 2012.