| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w18543 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 18543 |
| You Owe Me | |
| Ulrike Malmendier; Klaus Schmidt | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-11-15 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In many cultures and industries gifts are given in order to influence the recipient, often at the expense of a third party. Examples include business gifts of firms and lobbyists. In a series of experiments, we show that, even without incentive or informational effects, small gifts strongly influence the recipient's behavior in favor of the gift giver, in particular when a third party bears the cost. Subjects are well aware that the gift is given to influence their behavior but reciprocate nevertheless. Withholding the gift triggers a strong negative response. These findings are inconsistent with the most prominent models of social preferences. We propose an extension of existing theories to capture the observed behavior by endogenizing the "reference group" to whom social preferences are applied. We also show that disclosure and size limits are not effective in reducing the effect of gifts, consistent with our model. Financial incentives ameliorate the effect of the gift but backfire when available but not provided. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18543 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576218 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ulrike Malmendier,Klaus Schmidt. You Owe Me. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w18543.pdf（559KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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