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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w18573
来源IDWorking Paper 18573
Democracy Undone. Systematic Minority Advantage in Competitive Vote Markets
Alessandra Casella; Sébastien Turban
发表日期2012-11-29
出版年2012
语种英语
摘要We study the competitive equilibrium of a market for votes where voters can trade votes for a numeraire before making a decision via majority rule. The choice is binary and the number of supporters of either alternative is known. We identify a sufficient condition guaranteeing the existence of an ex ante equilibrium. In equilibrium, only the most intense voter on each side demands votes and each demands enough votes to alone control a majority. The probability of a minority victory is independent of the size of the minority and converges to one half, for any minority size, when the electorate is arbitrarily large. In a large electorate, the numerical advantage of the majority becomes irrelevant: democracy is undone by the market.
主题Microeconomics ; Mathematical Tools ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Other ; Economic Systems
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w18573
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576248
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GB/T 7714
Alessandra Casella,Sébastien Turban. Democracy Undone. Systematic Minority Advantage in Competitive Vote Markets. 2012.
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