| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w18573 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 18573 |
| Democracy Undone. Systematic Minority Advantage in Competitive Vote Markets | |
| Alessandra Casella; Sébastien Turban | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-11-29 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the competitive equilibrium of a market for votes where voters can trade votes for a numeraire before making a decision via majority rule. The choice is binary and the number of supporters of either alternative is known. We identify a sufficient condition guaranteeing the existence of an ex ante equilibrium. In equilibrium, only the most intense voter on each side demands votes and each demands enough votes to alone control a majority. The probability of a minority victory is independent of the size of the minority and converges to one half, for any minority size, when the electorate is arbitrarily large. In a large electorate, the numerical advantage of the majority becomes irrelevant: democracy is undone by the market. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Mathematical Tools ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Other ; Economic Systems |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18573 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576248 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandra Casella,Sébastien Turban. Democracy Undone. Systematic Minority Advantage in Competitive Vote Markets. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w18573.pdf（729KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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