全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Participation and Duration of Environmental Agreements

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w18585
来源ID	Working Paper 18585
	Participation and Duration of Environmental Agreements
	Marco Battaglini; Bård Harstad
发表日期	2012-12-06
出版年	2012
语种	英语
摘要	We analyze participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs) in a dynamic game where countries pollute and invest in green technologies. If complete contracts are feasible, participants eliminate the hold-up problem associated with their investments; however, most countries prefer to free-ride rather than participate. If investments are non-contractible, countries face a hold-up problem every time they negotiate; but the free-rider problem can be mitigated and significant participation is feasible. Participation becomes attractive because only large coalitions commit to long-term agreements that circumvent the hold-up problem. Under well-specified conditions even the first-best outcome is possible when the contract is incomplete. Since real-world IEAs fit in the incomplete contracting environment, our theory may help explaining the rising importance of IEAs and how they should be designed.
主题	Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; International Economics ; Globalization and International Relations ; Public Economics ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Environment
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w18585
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576259
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Marco Battaglini,Bård Harstad. Participation and Duration of Environmental Agreements. 2012.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w18585.pdf（372KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览