| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w18590 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 18590 |
| Buy-it-now or Take-a-chance: Price Discrimination through Randomized Auctions | |
| L. Elisa Celis; Gregory Lewis; Markus M. Mobius; Hamid Nazerzadeh | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-12-06 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Increasingly detailed consumer information makes sophisticated price discrimination possible. At fine levels of aggregation, demand may not obey standard regularity conditions. We propose a new randomized sales mechanism for such environments. Bidders can "buy-it-now" at a posted price, or "take-a-chance" in an auction where the top d > 1 bidders are equally likely to win. The randomized allocation incentivizes high valuation bidders to buy-it-now. We analyze equilibrium behavior, and apply our analysis to advertiser bidding data from Microsoft Advertising Exchange. In counterfactual simulations, our mechanism increases revenue by 4.4% and consumer surplus by 14.5% compared to an optimal second-price auction. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Economics of Information |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18590 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576264 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | L. Elisa Celis,Gregory Lewis,Markus M. Mobius,et al. Buy-it-now or Take-a-chance: Price Discrimination through Randomized Auctions. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w18590.pdf（496KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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