| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w18594 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 18594 |
| Costly Litigation and Optimal Damages | |
| A. Mitchell Polinsky; Steven Shavell | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-12-06 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A basic principle of law is that damages paid by a liable party should equal the harm caused by that party. However, this principle is not correct when account is taken of litigation costs, because they too are part of the social costs associated with an injury. In this article we examine the influence of litigation costs on the optimal level of damages, assuming that litigation costs rise with the level of damages. |
| 主题 | Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18594 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576268 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | A. Mitchell Polinsky,Steven Shavell. Costly Litigation and Optimal Damages. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w18594.pdf（108KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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