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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w18601
来源IDWorking Paper 18601
Narrow Framing and Life Insurance
Daniel Gottlieb; Kent Smetters
发表日期2012-12-06
出版年2012
语种英语
摘要Life insurance is a large yet poorly understood industry. A final death benefit is not paid for a majority of policies. Insurers make money on customers that lapse their policies and lose money on customers that keep their coverage. Policy loads are inverted relative to the dynamic pattern consistent with reclassification risk insurance. As an industry, insurers lobby to ban secondary markets despite the liquidity provided. These (and other) stylized facts cannot easily be explained by information problems alone. We demonstrate that a simple model of narrow framing, where consumers do not fully account for their need for future liquidity when purchasing insurance, offers a simple and unified explanation.
主题Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w18601
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576274
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Daniel Gottlieb,Kent Smetters. Narrow Framing and Life Insurance. 2012.
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