| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w18622 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 18622 |
| A Voting Architecture for the Governance of Free-Driver Externalities, with Application to Geoengineering | |
| Martin Weitzman | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-12-14 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Climate change is a global "free rider" problem because significant abatement of greenhouse gases is an expensive public good requiring international cooperation to apportion compliance among states. But it is also a global "free driver" problem because geoengineering the stratosphere with reflective particles to block incoming solar radiation is so cheap that it could essentially be undertaken unilaterally by one state perceiving itself to be in peril. This paper develops the main features of a "free driver" externality in a simple model based on the asymmetric consequences of type-I and type-II errors. I propose a social-choice decision architecture based on the solution concept of a supermajority voting rule and derive its basic properties. In the model this supermajority voting rule attains the socially optimal cooperative solution, which is a new theoretical result around which the paper is built. |
| 主题 | Environmental and Resource Economics ; Environment |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18622 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576297 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Martin Weitzman. A Voting Architecture for the Governance of Free-Driver Externalities, with Application to Geoengineering. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w18622.pdf（216KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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