| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w18634 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 18634 |
| Solomonic Separation: Risk Decisions as Productivity Indicators | |
| Nolan Miller; Alexander F. Wagner; Richard J. Zeckhauser | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-12-21 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A principal provides budgets to agents (e.g., divisions of a firm or the principal's children) whose expenditures provide her benefits, either materially or because of altruism. Only agents know their potential to generate benefits. We prove that if the more "productive" agents are also more risk-tolerant (as holds in the sample of individuals we surveyed), the principal can screen agents and bolster target efficiency by offering a choice between a nonrandom budget and a two-outcome risky budget. When, at very low allocations, the ratio of the more risk-averse type's marginal utility to that of the other type is unbounded above (e.g., as with CRRA), the first-best is approached. -- A biblical opening enlivens the analysis. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Public Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18634 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576309 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nolan Miller,Alexander F. Wagner,Richard J. Zeckhauser. Solomonic Separation: Risk Decisions as Productivity Indicators. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w18634.pdf（416KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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