| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w18636 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 18636 |
| Third-Party Opportunism and the Nature of Public Contracts | |
| Marian W. Moszoro; Pablo T. Spiller | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-12-21 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The lack of flexibility in public procurement design and implementation reflects public agents' political risk adaptation to limit hazards from opportunistic third parties - political opponents, competitors, interest groups - while externalizing the associated adaptation costs to the public at large. Reduced flexibility limits the likelihood of opportunistic challenge lowering third parties' expected gains and increasing litigation costs. We provide a comprehensible theoretical framework with empirically testable predictions. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18636 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576311 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marian W. Moszoro,Pablo T. Spiller. Third-Party Opportunism and the Nature of Public Contracts. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w18636.pdf（541KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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