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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w18638 |
来源ID | Working Paper 18638 |
Prominent Job Advertisements, Group Learning and Wage Dispersion | |
Julio J. Rotemberg | |
发表日期 | 2012-12-21 |
出版年 | 2012 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | A model is presented in which people base their labor search strategy on the average wage and the average unemployment duration of people who belong to their peer group. It is shown that, if the distribution of wage offers is not stationary so lower wage offers tend to arrive before higher wage ones, such learning can induce a great deal of wage inequality. An equilibrium model is developed in which firms can choose either to advertise their job openings prominently or not. Prominent ads are assumed to have more influence on more inexperienced job searchers who are less able to identify a multiplicity of viable jobs. Equilibria can then feature groups that learn naively from the experience of their members and accept low wage offers from prominent ads while other groups do not find these offers acceptable. A new test statistic is proposed that measures whether, as predicted by the model, the gains from increasing one's reservation wage are larger than either those that people expect or those predicted by models in which job offers are stationary. |
主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Unemployment and Immigration |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18638 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576313 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Julio J. Rotemberg. Prominent Job Advertisements, Group Learning and Wage Dispersion. 2012. |
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文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w18638.pdf(244KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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