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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w18638
来源IDWorking Paper 18638
Prominent Job Advertisements, Group Learning and Wage Dispersion
Julio J. Rotemberg
发表日期2012-12-21
出版年2012
语种英语
摘要A model is presented in which people base their labor search strategy on the average wage and the average unemployment duration of people who belong to their peer group. It is shown that, if the distribution of wage offers is not stationary so lower wage offers tend to arrive before higher wage ones, such learning can induce a great deal of wage inequality. An equilibrium model is developed in which firms can choose either to advertise their job openings prominently or not. Prominent ads are assumed to have more influence on more inexperienced job searchers who are less able to identify a multiplicity of viable jobs. Equilibria can then feature groups that learn naively from the experience of their members and accept low wage offers from prominent ads while other groups do not find these offers acceptable. A new test statistic is proposed that measures whether, as predicted by the model, the gains from increasing one's reservation wage are larger than either those that people expect or those predicted by models in which job offers are stationary.
主题Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Unemployment and Immigration
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w18638
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576313
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GB/T 7714
Julio J. Rotemberg. Prominent Job Advertisements, Group Learning and Wage Dispersion. 2012.
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