| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w18666 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 18666 |
| Search and Work in Optimal Welfare Programs | |
| Nicola Pavoni; Ofer Setty; Giovanni L. Violante | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-01-04 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Some existing welfare programs ("work-first") require participants to work in exchange for benefits. Others ("job search-first") emphasize private job-search and provide assistance in finding and retaining a durable employment. This paper studies the optimal design of welfare programs when (i) the principal/government is unable to observe the agent's effort, but can assist the agent's job search and can mandate the agent to work, and (ii) agents' skills depreciate during unemployment. In the optimal welfare program, assisted search is implemented between an initial spell of private search (unemployment insurance) and a final spell of pure income support where search effort is not elicited. To be effective, job-search assistance requires large reemployment subsidies. The optimal program features compulsory work activities for low levels of program's generosity (i.e., its promised utility or available budget). The threat of mandatory work acts like a punishment that facilitates the provision of search incentives without compromising consumption smoothing too much. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Public Economics ; Taxation ; Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Unemployment and Immigration |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18666 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576341 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nicola Pavoni,Ofer Setty,Giovanni L. Violante. Search and Work in Optimal Welfare Programs. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w18666.pdf（216KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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