| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w18677
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 18677
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| Financing Through Asset Sales |
| Alex Edmans; William Mann
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| 发表日期 | 2013-01-04
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| 出版年 | 2013
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Most research on firm financing studies the choice between debt and equity. We model an alternative source - non-core asset sales - and allow asset sales to occur for operational as well as financing motives. We identify three new factors that drive a firm's choice between selling assets and equity. First, equity investors own a claim to the cash raised. Since cash is certain, this mitigates the information asymmetry of equity (the "certainty effect"). In contrast to Myers and Majluf (1984), even if assets exhibit less information asymmetry, the firm issues equity if the financing need is high. This result is robust to using the cash for an uncertain investment. Second, firms can disguise the sale of a low-quality asset as instead being motivated by operational reasons (dissynergies), and thus receive a high price (the "camouflage effect"). Third, selling equity implies a "lemons" discount for not only the equity issued but also the rest of the firm, since its value is perfectly correlated. In contrast, a "lemons" discount on assets need not lead to a low stock price, as the asset is not a carbon copy of the firm (the "correlation effect"). |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
; Corporate Finance
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18677
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576349
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Alex Edmans,William Mann. Financing Through Asset Sales. 2013.
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文件名：
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w18677.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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