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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w18764 |
来源ID | Working Paper 18764 |
It Pays to Set the Menu: Mutual Fund Investment Options in 401(k) Plans | |
Veronika K. Pool; Clemens Sialm; Irina Stefanescu | |
发表日期 | 2013-02-01 |
出版年 | 2013 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper investigates whether mutual fund families acting as trustees of 401(k) plans display favoritism toward their own funds. Using a hand-collected dataset on retirement investment options, we show that poorly-performing funds are less likely to be removed from and more likely to be added to a 401(k) menu if they are affiliated with the plan trustee. We find no evidence that plan participants undo this affiliation bias through their investment choices. Finally, the subsequent performance of poorly-performing affiliated funds indicates that these trustee decisions are not information driven and are costly to retirement savers. |
主题 | Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing ; Financial Institutions ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18764 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576438 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Veronika K. Pool,Clemens Sialm,Irina Stefanescu. It Pays to Set the Menu: Mutual Fund Investment Options in 401(k) Plans. 2013. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w18764.pdf(621KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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