| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w18766 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 18766 |
| Uncertainty as Commitment | |
| Jaromir Nosal; Guillermo Ordoñez | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-02-01 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Time-inconsistency of no-bailout policies can create incentives for banks to take excessive risks and generate endogenous crises when the government cannot commit. However, at the outbreak of financial problems, usually the government is uncertain about their nature, and hence it may delay intervention to learn more about them. We show that intervention delay leads to strategic restraint banks endogenously restrict the riskiness of their portfolio relative to their peers in order to avoid being the worst performers and bearing the cost of such delay. These novel forces help to avoid endogenous crises even when the government cannot commit. We analyze the effect of government policies from the perspective of this new result. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; General Equilibrium ; Economics of Information ; Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Monetary Policy ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w18766 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/576440 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jaromir Nosal,Guillermo Ordoñez. Uncertainty as Commitment. 2013. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w18766.pdf（933KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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